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A country entering a monetary union gives up the right to determine its own 
monetary policy, thereby relinquishing monetary instruments to assure fiscal 
solvency. In this paper, we develop a new theoretical model to address fiscal 
solvency risk. We show that when debt is subject to an upper bound and policy faces 
stochastic shocks, a government can find itself in a position for which the expected 
present value of future surpluses under current policy is less than debt. Agents 
refuse to lend into such a position, and the sudden stop of capital flows defines a 
fiscal solvency crisis. We model the dynamics of a fiscal solvency crisis in a 
monetary union under the assumption that the fiscal authority will respond to the 
crisis using default to reduce the value of debt. We simulate the model to estimate 
fiscal solvency risk in the European Monetary Union. We find that countries 
adhering to the Stability and Growth Pack limits are perfectly safe, while countries 
like Greece and Italy, whose debt relative to GDP has strayed far above the 60 
percent limit, are not. 
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 Sovereign Default Risk in a Monetary Union
1 Introduction
A government, whose debt is denominated in its own currency, need never face default.
In the event of insolvency, created by an unexpected spending need or revenue shortfall,
the country can always restore solvency with seigniorage (Sargent and Wallace 1981)
and/or debt devaluation through unexpected inﬂation.1 Monetary union eliminates these
instruments unless the union is willing to sacriﬁce price stability to restore solvency for an
individual country. The European Central Bank has a single mandate of price stability,
and no explicit mandate for individual country ﬁscal solvency.
Founders of the European Monetary Union were concerned that ﬁscal insolvency could
threaten the currency union. They sought to replace the loss of individual-country mon-
etary policy instruments with more prudent ﬁscal policy by placing limits on debt and
the deﬁcit. However, the world-wide ﬁnancial crisis and recession, which began in 2007
and accelerated in 2008, has had profoundly negative consequences for government bud-
get deﬁcits and debt, with almost all countries in violation of the limits. In 2009 and
2010, interest rates for some countries relative to German rates spiked, reﬂecting market
concern that these countries might default on their debt. What does economic theory
have to oﬀer about market concerns that some EMU countries could default?
In traditional models of sovereign default, a sovereign defaults when beneﬁts to default
exceed costs, typically modeled either as exclusion from future capital markets or as
1 The government can allow real returns on nominal government debt to be state-contingent even though
nominal returns, as measured by nominal interest rates, are not (Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe 1991).
This is achieved by surprise changes in the price level, which aﬀect the real value of government debt,
and is the mechanism in the “Fiscal Theory of the Price Level” (FTPL) (Sims 1994, Woodford 1994).
1sanctions on output.2 Since these punishments are independent of the magnitude of
default in the traditional models, the magnitude is always one hundred percent.3 Also,
the cost of these punishments, compared with the beneﬁts of complete debt repudiation,
are not large enough to support magnitudes of debt empirically observed.4 Additionally,
the traditional models ignore the distortionary eﬀect of taxation with the assumption that
the central-planner-sovereign can seize any amount of GDP to pay debt obligations, and,
hence, is always solvent. The deadly riots in the streets of Athens in May 2010, in response
to announced austerity measures, are a painful contradiction to this assumption. Even
in less extreme situations, a sovereign is limited in the amount of tax revenue, relative
to GDP, that it can raise. Even if a sovereign, weighing costs and beneﬁts, wanted to
repay debt, there are limits on what it can repay. Perhaps the market is trying to decide
if Greece has the ability to honor its debt, a solvency concern, not addressed in the
traditional literature on sovereign default.
Financial fragility models oﬀer an alternative explanation of sovereign default as one of
several multiple equilibria once fundamentals become weak (Cole and Kehoe, 1996, 2000).
The implication of these models is that, among the countries with weak fundamentals,
actual default will be determined by exogenous self-fulﬁlling expectations of default, where
default is again one hundred percent. In actual experience, default is never complete.
In this paper, we argue that interest rate spikes in Greece and several other EMU
2 The seminal paper using exclusion from future capital markets is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (1996) discuss sanctions. Eaton and Fernandez (1995) provide a survey.
3 Yue (2010) modiﬁes the traditional model by allowing default magnitude of less than one hundred
percent to be determined by bargaining.
4 Greek debt/GDP was 114.88% at the end of 2009, and the OECD forecasts it to rise to 130.2% by the
end of 2011. Arellano and Heathcote (2009) ﬁnd that credit market exclusion can sustain debt ceilings
of between one and three percent of GDP. Yue (2010) allows for partial debt recovery and obtains higher
values for debt ceilings around ten percent of GDP.
2countries, relative to Germany, reﬂect a potential ﬁscal solvency crisis, not a discretionary
sovereign default crisis or a bad outcome of multiple equilibria. We develop a new model
of sovereign default as the policy response to a ﬁscal solvency crises. Bohn (1998, 2007)
has shown that a positive response of a government’s primary surplus to debt is suﬃcient
to assure intertemporal government budget balance, implying ﬁscal sustainability and
solvency. However, every government faces limits on its ability to raise taxes and reduce
spending, which implies an upper bound on the present value of the primary surplus
relative to GDP and an upper bound on the value of debt relative to GDP which the
primary surplus can service.5 Fiscal policy, relating the government primary surplus to
outstanding debt, can be combined with the government’s ﬂow budget constraint to yield
an expected time path for debt. When there is an upper bound on debt, current ﬁscal
policy is sustainable only when debt does not violate the upper bound along this expected
time path.
Therefore, our requirement for ﬁscal sustainability is stronger than Bohn’s and has
two parts. First, the ﬁscal response to debt must be strong enough that debt is expected
to reach a long-run equilibrium which does not exceed its upper bound. Bohn’s criteria
allows debt to grow as long as it grows more slowly than the growth-adjusted interest
rate. Second, in the transition to the long-run, debt cannot reach levels greater than the
maximum present value of future surpluses. This is because the surpluses necessary to
service that debt would be infeasible. The upper bound together with stochastic ﬁscal
shocks implies that a ﬁscal policy, classiﬁed as sustainable according to criteria in Bohn
5 Other authors are beginning to model the implications of upper bounds on debt, including Bi (2010),
Bi and Leeper (2010), and Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010).
3(1998, 2007), could violate the upper bound in the long run or have a positive probability of
violating the upper bound in the transition to the long run, and therefore be unsustainable
according to the stronger criteria.
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is the development of a new theoretical model to
address ﬁscal solvency risk in the presence of an upper bound on debt and stochastic shocks
to the government’s primary surplus. If ﬁscal shocks, together with expectations of debt
devaluation, send debt onto a path which violates the upper bound, agents refuse to lend
because they cannot expect market rates of return. The sudden stop in lending deﬁnes
the ﬁscal solvency crisis. The dynamics in the neighborhood of a ﬁscal solvency crisis
are partially determined by expectations of the policy response to restore equilibrium.
We focus on a policy response in which the crisis country reduces the magnitude of debt
through partial default to restore ﬁscal solvency.6 The default response allows us to
present a new model of sovereign default as a consequence of ﬁscal insolvency, in contrast
to the traditional sovereign default models.7 We show that default without ﬁscal reform
leaves markets turbulent with additional defaults following the initial one. We also brieﬂy
consider other policy responses, including a decision by the central bank to restore solvency
with a change in monetary policy for the union, ﬁscal reform raising the present value of
future surpluses, and ﬁscal transfers from solvent member countries.
Our second contribution is that we simulate the model to provide estimates of ﬁscal
solvency risk in the EMU. We ﬁnd that the probability of a ﬁscal solvency crisis over
6 The model extends the model of ﬁscal risk introduced by Daniel (2010), by allowing for a more general
ﬁscal policy and by focusing on the policy response of default.
7 Bi and Leeper (2010) present a sovereign default model in which the sovereign defaults if its stochastic
upper bound on debt, modeled as the largest debt the government is willing to service, exceeds actual
debt.
4a horizon of ten years is zero for countries with values of debt and the primary surplus
bound by the Maastricht Treaty limits. For countries like Greece and Italy, in which
2009 debt strayed far above these limits, crisis probability over the next ten years, based
on 2009 debt and surpluses is positive, but small.8 However, small changes in baseline
parameters, or increases in debt to levels projected by the OECD for 2011 can increase
the probability of a crisis substantially. Once expectations of a default become positive,
the probability of a crisis rises at an increasing rate due to the eﬀect of expectations of
default on interest rates and, therefore, on the rate of debt accumulation. Other papers
provide estimates of ﬁscal risk, based on VAR models of debt, but this risk is that of debt
relative to GDP reaching an upper bound (Garcia and Rigobon 2004), or beginning to
grow (Tanner and Samake 2008), over a particular horizon. Neither of these events need
cause a crisis, and both measures miss the endogenous acceleration of the growth of debt
in the neighborhood of a crisis due to the eﬀect of expectations on interest rates.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the new theoretical
model. The third section considers dynamics leading to a ﬁscal crisis. The fourth section
contains simulations of ﬁscal risk. The ﬁfth section concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Overview
In this section, we set up a simple model of a monetary union which we can use to
address ﬁscal solvency risk. The model contains four key assumptions. First, international
creditors lend to a government only when they expect to receive the market rate of return.
8 These numbers have been revised since we conducted our simulations.
5Second, there is an upper bound on the present value of primary surpluses relative to
output which a country can sustain. Third, ﬁscal policy is subject to stochastic shocks.
Together the upper bound and stochastic shocks imply risk on government debt, reﬂecting
t h ec o n c e r nb yt h eE M Uf o u n d e r sa n dt h er e a l i t yt h a tag o v e r n m e n t ’ sc o m m i t m e n tt o
raise taxes cannot be totally unconditional. Fourth, institutions are strong enough that
a solvent government always repays.
We ﬁll out the model with enough structure to obtain an equation for the evolution
of government debt relative to output. This requires speciﬁcation of monetary and ﬁscal
policy as well as government budget constraints. We assume that the monetary authority
has a price level target and that the ﬁscal authority follows a rule relating the current
primary surplus to past debt. The rule is subject to stochastic shocks, giving ﬁscal policy
risk. The rule we choose is simple and does not require full speciﬁcation of a general
equilibrium model. However, any rule with ﬁscal risk could be used to complete the
model.
2.2 Goods and Asset Markets
We assume that the monetary union consists of N countries. The j =1 ,2,...,N countries
are small enough that they cannot aﬀect the world price level or world interest rate. There
is a single good in the world, implying that equilibrium in goods markets requires the law
of one price. Normalizing the world price level at unity and assuming no world inﬂation
implies that the equilibrium price level in the monetary union is the exchange rate.
The ﬁrst key assumption is that international creditors are willing to buy and sell
country j0s government bonds as long as its interest rate, ijt,s a t i s ﬁes interest rate parity.
6Interest rate parity can be derived as the Euler equation for a representative world agent
when the covariance of the country j interest rate with world-agent consumption is zero,
or when the world agent is risk neutral. Under the additional assumptions that the world














,j =1 ,2,...N (1)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on time t information, Pt denotes the price
level in the monetary union, and δjt+1 is the fraction of the value of the j country’s bond
that will be repaid in period t +1 .
Interest rates in the monetary union countries can rise above the world interest rate
when there is some possibility of a crisis which will be resolved with either default





. If default is used to resolve ﬁscal crises, then a country
with a positive probability of default in the next period, such that Etδjt+1 < 1, would
have an interest rate which is higher than the rate in other member countries for which
there is no probability of default. If default is ruled out as a policy response to a crisis,
then δjt+1 ≡ 1 ∀j, t, and all N member-country interest rates are equal. They can be
higher than the world rate when there is some probability that debt devaluation through
unexpected inﬂation will be used to resolve a crisis. In this paper, we focus on the default
response and only brieﬂy consider unexpected inﬂation.9
2.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is assumed to have a ﬁxed price level target, implying an inﬂation target
of zero. When there is no probability of debt devaluation through either default or
9 See Daniel (2010) and Daniel and Shiamptanis (2010) for a more complete analysis of a policy-response
allowing surprise inﬂation.
7inﬂa t i o ni nt h en e x tp e r i o df o ra n yo ft h eN countries, the price level is ﬁxed at its target
and interest rate parity from equation (1) implies that the nominal interest rates for all
countries are equal at ijt = i.10When there is a positive probability of debt devaluation, we
assume that the monetary authority maintains its price-level target and lets the interest
rate rise to satisfy equation (1).
2.4 Fiscal Policy
2.4.1 Government Flow Budget Constraint
We assume that member governments issue bonds denominated in the common currency.
Assuming that a fraction, ηj, of the union’s money supply, Mt, is supported by country
j0s domestic bonds, a member country’s nominal ﬂow government budget constraint is
given by
Bjt + ηjMt = δjt
£
(1 + it−1)Bjt−1 + ηjMt−1
¤
+ Gjt − τjtPtYjt,
where Bjt is nominal government bonds held by the public, Gjt is nominal government
expenditures, Yjt is real output and τjt is the tax rate on nominal output of country
j. Letting small letters denote values relative to output and dropping the j notation to
simplify, the values of debt relative to output and the primary surplus relative to output























Allowing for inﬂation and default, either of which could be created by a ﬁscal solvency
crisis, the government’s ﬂow budget constraint can be expressed in terms of debt and the
10This policy could be implemented with a Taylor rule, whereby the monetary authority follows the
Taylor principle, raising the nominal interest rate by more than any price level increase.









bt−1 − st, (2)
where πt = Pt
Pt−1 − 1 is the inﬂation rate, and g = Yt
Yt−1 − 1 i st h er e a lo u t p u tg r o w t h
rate.12 Imposing interest rate parity from equation (1) and deﬁning γt as capital loss on











the equation for the evolution of debt relative to output can be expressed as
bt =( 1+r)bt−1 − st − (γt − Et−1γt). (3)





, and (γt − Et−1γt) is the
unexpected capital loss on government debt. Capital loss on debt can occur due to either
unexpected inﬂation or default. Expectations of capital loss raise the interest rate, and
when the capital loss does not occur, debt accumulates in response to the higher interest
rate. Equilibrium capital loss is never one hundred percent of debt, consistent with
empirical evidence and in contrast to the traditional sovereign default model.
Optimization by the representative agent, together with the assumption that govern-
ments do not allow their debt to become negative in the limit,13 implies a government

























that the ﬁscal authority can adjust the surplus to oﬀset these.
12We assume growth is non-stochastic to simplify the analysis. We could analyze the implications of
stochastic growth using a linearized model, but we reserve this for future work.
13Sims (1997), Woodford (1997) and Daniel (2001) argue that no country, acting to maximize utility of
its own agents, would allow the present-value of its debt to become negative in the limit.
14Woodford (1994) derives the constraint as an equilibrium condition for a closed economy.
9Note that unexpected capital loss on government debt is a source of government revenue.
2.4.2 Upper Bound
The second key assumption is that there is an upper bound on the present value of
t h ep r i m a r ys u r p l u sr e l a t i v et oo u t p u tt h a tag o v e r n m e n tc a ns u s t a i n .W em o t i v a t et h i s
with the realization that taxes are distortionary such that there is an upper bound on the
fraction of income that a government can collect in taxes. Additionally, there is a limit
below which government spending, necessary in the provision of public goods, cannot be
reduced. Using the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, equation (4), implies





where ¯ ϕ is the value of the upper bound on the primary surplus relative to output. The
upper bound rules out an equilibrium in which debt relative to output is explosive.15
Since the model is speciﬁed in terms of the primary surplus and debt relative to output,
w er e f e rt ot h e s ev a r i a b l e ss i m p l ya st h es u r p l u sa n dd e b tw h e nt h e r ei sn oc o n f u s i o n .
2.4.3 Fiscal Policy Rule
We assume that the ﬁscal authority is able to commit to a policy rule for the surplus16,
in which the surplus responds to its own lag (st−1) and a linear combination of the target
15This is more restrictive than an intertemporal budget constraint in the absence of an upper bound,
in which debt can grow forever, as long as its growth rate is less than the interest rate, as in Bohn
(1998, 2007). Additionally, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) base their empirical test determining
whether monetary policy in the US is active or passive on the intertemporal budget constraint, as in
early presentations of the FTPL. Sims (1997) argues that governments instead should be concerned with
stabilizing debt relative to GDP, as in the current paper. Cochrane (1998) explains the diﬀerence in the
two perspectives.
16The rule gives the government credibility, limiting the eﬀect of negative ﬁscal shocks on the expected
present value of future surpluses.
10value of the long-run primary surplus (ϕ) and debt service (rbt−1) at the growth-adjusted
interest rate. The surplus rule for a particular country is given by
st =( 1 − α)st−1 + α[(1 − λ)ϕ + λrbt−1]+νt, (6)
r
1+r
<α < 1, 0 ≤ λ, 0 <ϕ≤ ¯ ϕ,
where (1−a) measures persistence in the surplus and λ represents the responsiveness of the
surplus to the value for debt service relative to its long-run target value. The lagged value
of the surplus reﬂects the desire to smooth the eﬀect of shocks over time and is consistent
with empirical evidence showing persistence in the primary surplus. The parameters α
and λ are viewed as policy choices, and in the simulations we use the estimated values
from Daniel and Shiamptanis (2010).17 The third key assumption is that ﬁscal policy
is subject to bounded, zero-mean stochastic shocks, νt. Stochastic shocks represent both
truly unanticipated ﬁscal shocks, including war, natural disaster, or the recent ﬁnancial
crisis, as well as ﬁscal policy responses to the state of the economy.
Equations (3) and (6) imply dynamic equations for the surplus and debt
st =( 1 − α)st−1 + α(1 − λ)ϕ + αλrbt−1 + νt (7)
bt =( 1 + r − αλr)bt−1 − (1 − α)st−1 − α(1 − λ)ϕ − νt − γt + Et−1γt (8)
Together, the upper bound and stochastic shocks imply ﬁscal solvency risk to government
debt, reﬂecting the reality that a government’s commitment to raise taxes cannot be
totally unconditional. Governments understand this risk, and the parameters they choose
(α, λ) reﬂect their risk tolerance, determined, in part, by the cost of a crisis. Empirically,
17The restrictions are imposed to yield a stationary long-run equilibrium in which debt and the surplus
are not changing, relative to output.
11countries do choose surplus rules with risk, and the Maastricht limits on debt and deﬁcits
reﬂect policy-maker concerns that at least some EMU countries might choose relatively
risky rules.18
The fourth key assumption is that a solvent government honors its debt. Speciﬁ-
cally, when the path of debt and the surplus, implied by its chosen ﬁscal policy and given
in equations (7) and (8), keep debt from exceeding its upper bound, the sovereign honors
its debt.
2.5 Stability and Dynamics
Stability properties are determined by the eigenvalues of the dynamic equations (7) and
(8). Letting θ represent eigenvalues, which are assumed to be real and distinct, the
characteristic equation for each country is given by
(1 − α)(1+r) − θ[2 + r(1 − αλ) − α]+θ
2 =0 . (9)
Letting θ1 be the larger eigenvalue, a value for λ>0 is suﬃcient to assure that θ1 < 1+r,




¢T =0assuring ﬁscal sustainability in the sense of Bohn
(2007).
However, when 0 <λ<1,θ 1 exceeds unity, implying that debt relative to output can
grow forever, eventually exceeding any upper bound. When debt has an upper bound,
explosive paths for debt are inconsistent with equilibrium. The upper bound prevents
a government from raising present-value surpluses suﬃciently to service explosive debt.
18The upper bound on debt and the ﬁscal policy rule together imply a lower bound on the surplus. There
are values for the surplus so low that all values for debt violate the upper bound in the approach to
the long-run equilibrium. Given an initial surplus value substantially above the minimum, the system is
very unlikely to approach the minimum. However, in the event that it does, the error process must be
restricted to rule out such low values.
12Therefore, the ﬁscal policy parameters must imply global stability to rule out explosive
paths. Global stability requires that both eigenvalues be on or inside the unit circle, which
implies restricting λ such that λ ≥ 1.
Eﬀectively, with an upper bound, a necessary condition for ﬁscal solvency is that the
ﬁscal authority follow a rule with λ ≥ 1. This is stronger than ﬁscal sustainability in Bohn
(2007). However, upper bounds can yield solvency crises even under a surplus rule with
λ ≥ 1, implying that this condition is not suﬃcient for solvency. A solvency crisis can
occur if the adjustment path toward long-run equilibrium requires a value for debt which
exceeds the upper bound. We turn to this below.
It is useful to represent the dynamics of the debt-surplus system using country phase
diagrams.19 We construct the phase diagram for each country by subtracting lagged values
of the surplus from equation (7) and lagged values of debt from equation (8) to yield:
∆st = st − st−1 = −αst−1 + α(1 − λ)ϕ + αλrbt−1 + νt, (10)
∆bt = bt − bt−1 =( 1− αλ)rbt−1 − (1 − α)st−1 − α(1 − λ)ϕ − νt − γt + Et−1γt. (11)
The phase diagram with λ>1 and with νt = γt−Et−1γt =0i sg i v e ni nF i g u r e1 .D e b t
service (rb) is on the vertical axis and the surplus is on the horizontal axis. The ∆s =0
and ∆b =0schedules intersect at point P with st = ϕ = rbt, representing a long-run
equilibrium. The system is globally stable around its long-run equilibrium target values.
If initial debt and the surplus are at point A, then the system is expected to travel along
AP, eventually reaching the long-run equilibrium point P. Equations (10) and (11) can be
used to show that with γt − Et−1γt =0 , the relationship between debt and the surplus
19Solutions for equations (7) and (8) with λ ≥ 1 are given in the appendix.










Note that in the range for which this slope is positive, a positive expected future ﬁscal
shock reduces the slope of the adjustment path, such that debt is expected to attain lower
values in its approach to a long-run equilibrium.
Over time, ﬁscal shocks (νt) could move the system away from its initial adjustment
path, labelled AP, possibly to an adjustment path like HP. This path violates the govern-
ment’s intertemporal budget constraint because it requires that debt be expected to pass
through a point where it exceeds the maximum present value of future surpluses. Since
the ﬁscal authority could never service or repay such a large debt, agents could not expect
t or e c e i v et h em a r k e tr a t eo fr e t u r no nd e b ta l o n gt h ep a t hH P ,i m p l y i n gt h a tH Pc a n n o t
be an equilibrium path.
As a country nears a crisis, which could require γt > 0, agents begin to anticipate
capital loss. The expectation aﬀects the evolution of debt and surpluses. Once shocks,
together with expectations, send the system onto a path like HP, agents refuse to lend.
This sudden stop of capital ﬂows due to insolvency requires a ﬁscal response since the
government cannot continue its policy of smoothing ﬁscal shocks using government debt.
The timing of the sudden stop itself and the actual dynamics depend on how the ﬁscal
authority is expected to react to the crisis. In this paper, we focus on the policy response
of debt devaluation through default.
143 Fiscal Solvency Crisis
We model the equilibrium dynamics leading to a ﬁscal solvency crisis when the government
responds to the crisis with default. We assume that agents know the ﬁscal response to the
crisis.20 A ﬁscal solvency crisis is most likely to occur in the region in which the debt and
surplus are rising. We restrict initial values to this region. Equilibrium is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 1 Given constant values for the world interest rate and world price level, a
monetary price-level target, a surplus rule (equation 7), an upper bound on debt (equation
5), and a policy-response in the event of a ﬁscal crisis for each country, an equilibrium
is a set of time series processes for each country’s primary surplus, debt, and capital
loss on debt, {bt,s t,γt}
∞
t=0,s u c ht h a te a c hg o v e r n m e n t ’ sﬂow and intertemporal budget
constraints (equations 8 and 4) hold, expectations are rational, the debt for each country
does not exceed its upper bound, and world agents expect to receive the return on assets
determined by interest rate parity (equation 1).
3.1 Default
Consider the case in which the country responds to a sudden stop of capital by reducing
the magnitude of debt through default. With this crisis response, the ﬁscal authority
remains committed to the ﬁscal policy rule, given by equation (10). As agents anticipate
default in country h, Etδht+1 < 1. The monetary authority upholds its price level target
by keeping ijt = i for all j 6= h, allowing iht to rise to satisfy equation (1) for the crisis
country.
Assume that, when faced with a crisis in which it cannot borrow the desired
amount, the government reduces the magnitude of debt through a default to
assure that debt is not expected to travel above ˆ ϕ/r ≤ ¯ ϕ/r and to assure that it
is expected to reach a long-run equilibrium value of
ϕ
r. Note that we are allowing
20Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010) show that uncertainty regarding how a shock will ultimately be
ﬁnanced can aﬀect dynamic behavior. Cooper, Kempf, and Peled (2008) show how alternative policy
responses can represent multiple equilibria based on agents’ beliefs about the policy response.
15the government to choose a default magnitude larger than necessary to restore solvency,
but we are assuming that agents know this choice. This requires that the government
reduce the magnitude of the current value of debt, given by equation (8), to the value of
debt along the adjustment path that is expected to reach a desired maximum at
ˆ ϕ
r.N o t e ,
that in contrast to earlier models of sovereign default, the magnitude of default will never
be one hundred percent of debt.
Deﬁnition 2 A boundary locus for debt service (rb) is located on the adjustment path
tangent to the desired maximum value for rb, given by ˆ ϕ. The boundary locus is the
portion of this path for which the surplus is rising.
Figure 1 shows the boundary locus for debt as BLXN. Debt service reaches its desired
maximum value at point L, and debt service equals the surplus at point X. Note that
the boundary locus is deﬁn e dw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sd e s i r e dm a x i m u mv a l u e
of debt, not by its upper bound.
Given the government’s policy response of reducing the value of debt to the boundary
locus, the expectation of one-period-ahead capital loss on government debt is determined
by the distance between the value of debt along the boundary locus, given by ˆ bt, and the
current value of debt, given by bt.W ea p p r o x i m a t et h ev a l u ef o rˆ bt, implied by equations
(10), (11), and (12), by taking a piecewise linear approximation of this path about st−1
and ˆ bt−1,t oy i e l d 21




(st − st−1), (13)
21The path for ˆ bt has a maximum at
ˆ ϕ
r and has γt = Et−1γt =0 . We need its value for any given value




together with its t − 1





is the slope of the boundary locus BLXN,
βt−1 =
rˆ bt−1 − st−1
α
³
λrˆ bt−1 − st−1 +( 1− λ)ϕ
´, (14)
and st−st−1 is given by equation (10). The denominator in (14) represents the change in
the surplus along the boundary locus and is always positive. Note that βt−1 > 1 when debt
is rising along BL, βt−1 =1once debt reaches its maximum level at point L, and βt−1 < 0
once the surplus exceeds debt service along XN, such that debt is falling. We show below
that a positive crisis probability requires values of the surplus such that βt−1 > 0.
We can compare the distance between ˆ bt and bt by subtracting equation (8) from
equation (13) to yield
Ωt = ˆ bt − bt = μt−1Ωt−1 + βt−1νt + γt − Et−1γt, (15)
where
μt−1 =1+
αr(1 − λ)(ϕ − st−1)
α
³
λrˆ bt−1 − st−1 +( 1− λ)ϕ
´ > 0.
The sign reﬂects the fact that adjustment paths, conditional on diﬀerent initial values, do
not cross.22
We deﬁne a shadow value of default, analogous to the shadow value of the exchange
rate in generation one currency crisis models (Flood and Garber 1984). Conditional on a
crisis in which agents refuse to lend, the shadow value of default represents the reduction
in the value of debt needed for the economy to reach the boundary locus. The shadow
value can be positive or negative.
Deﬁnition 3 The shadow value of capital loss on debt due to default at time t, ˜ γt, is
deﬁned as the value of γt for which Ωt =0 .
22It also reveals that the measure of the distance is a good approximation of the actual distance only in
regions for which slope of the boundary locus BLXN is not changing too rapidly or for which the slopes
of the boundary locus BLXN and the actual adjustment path are both positive.
17Setting Ωt to zero in equation (15) implies
˜ γt = Et−1γt − μt−1Ωt−1 − βt−1νt. (16)
Assume that agents believe that the ﬁscal borrowing constraint will bind,
creating default, if βt−1 > 0 and ˜ γt > 0. We prove that this assumption is consistent
with a rational expectations equilibrium below in Proposition 2. Under this assumption,
the actual value of capital loss due to default is given by
γt =m a x{˜ γt,0} =m a x
©
Et−1γt − μt−1Ωt−1 − βt−1νt,0
ª
, (17)
where we have used equation (16) to substitute for ˜ γt.
In order to solve for the magnitude of default, γt, we must ﬁrst solve for the expecta-
tions of default, Et−1γt.
Proposition 1 Given a value of the surplus for which βt−1 > 0 and μt−1 > 0, together
with the ﬁscal policy rule, with plans for default when the government cannot borrow, an
equilibrium solution for the magnitude of expected default (Et−1γt) exists if and only if
Ωt−1 ≥ 0.
All proofs are contained in the appendix. Intuitively, the proposition implies that
if debt is below its boundary locus at time t − 1, creditors can be compensated for
expectations of default. If debt is above its boundary locus at time t − 1,t h e r ea r e
no values for actual and rationally-expected period-t default, which both restore ﬁscal
solvency and provide the market rate of return to international creditors.
Corollary 1 For βt−1 > 0, when Ωt−1 > 0, the probability of a crisis in period t is less
than one, and when Ωt−1 =0 , the probability of a crisis in period t is one.
We can use the phase diagram in Figure 1 to understand expectations of default and the
probability of a crisis. When the system is far from its boundary locus BLXN, such that
18no ﬁscal shock could send it over, the probability of a crisis next period is zero, implying
that expectations of default are zero. The system is governed by the arrows of motion
toward long-run equilibrium target values. Once the system reaches the neighborhood
of the boundary locus, the probability of a crisis becomes positive and agents begin to
expect default. The associated default-risk premium on debt increases the interest rate,
causing debt to increase more quickly than shown along illustrated adjustment paths.
Once debt has risen so much that it lies on the boundary locus (Ωt−1 =0 ), the prob-
ability of a crisis next period is unity. Therefore, expectations of default are so high that
default is avoided only for the most favorable ﬁscal shock.23 Using equation (17) to solve
for the magnitude of default once Ωt−1 =0yields
γt = Et−1γt − βt−1νt ≥ 0.
The sign restriction is necessary since default must be greater than or equal to zero for
any realization of νt, including its upper bound value of ¯ ν. This yields
Et−1γt ≥ βt−1νt. (18)
Therefore, when debt is on the boundary locus, there are multiple equilibria, in which
actual and expected default must be positive and can be arbitrarily large. To verify, take
the expectation of equation (17), when the probability of default is unity, to yield an
identity in the expectation.
Av a l u eo fΩt−1 < 0 would imply that debt is above the boundary locus, even with
the most favorable ﬁscal shock, such that the probability of default is unity. Taking the
23The probability of the most favorable shock in a continuous distribution is zero.
19expectation of equation (17), when the probability of default is unity, yields
Et−1γt = Et−1γt − μt−1Ωt−1,
an impossibility. Rationally anticipated default cannot restore ﬁscal solvency because
actual default cannot equal itself plus a gap. Therefore, in equilibrium, the dynamics
must bound the system away from positions for which Ωt−1 < 0. This criterion determines
crisis timing.
Proposition 2 There is no equilibrium without default in period t if ˜ γt > 0.D e f a u l t ,
given by γt =˜ γt, restores equilibrium.
The proof in the appendix shows that if ˜ γt > 0 and there is no default, then Ωt < 0,
violating conditions for an equilibrium. Therefore, default must occur whenever ˜ γt > 0
to assure equilibrium. Intuitively, in the event of a sudden stop, the country promises
default in magnitude suﬃcient to place the system on the adjustment path toward the
desired upper bound, thereby restoring ﬁscal solvency. The sudden stop occurs when
˜ γt > 0, and the government responds as promised. Therefore, Proposition 2 validates
agents’ assumption that the government will default whenever ˜ γt > 0.
Corollary 2 A government which wants to sustain current ﬁscal policy as long as possible
chooses ˆ ϕ =¯ ϕ.
A larger value for ˆ ϕ implies a higher boundary locus, implying that the distance
between debt along the boundary locus and any initial value is greater. The greater is
this distance, the lower is the probability of a ﬁscal solvency crisis.
Proposition 3 In the absence of ﬁscal reform, equilibrium after default requires addi-
tional default each period until surplus rises above debt service.
20Initial default places the system on the boundary locus (Ωt−1 =0 )implying that the
expectations of default are large enough that default occurs next period for any ﬁscal
shock. Post-crisis equilibrium is characterized by repeated default which can be arbitrarily
large in magnitude. This is because of the one-sided nature of default, whereby default
always reduces the value of debt. Expectations of default must be correct on average,
implying that expectations of default must be the average value of default. Therefore,
following the crisis, markets remain turbulent for some time. Agents expect additional
default, interest rates are high, and additional default is necessary. This pattern does
eventually end once the dynamics pass point X and move the economy toward its long-
run equilibrium along the adjustment path.
Proposition 4 Once the surplus is high enough that βt−1 ≤ 0, the one-period-ahead
probability of a crisis is zero.
This is the region XN in Figure 1. Once βt−1 ≤ 0, negative shocks do not send the
system above the boundary locus, and positive shocks move the system further below the
upper bound. Rapidly falling debt implies that the system is safe in this region.
3.2 Summary: Characteristics of a Sovereign Default Crisis
It is useful to summarize the characteristics of a ﬁscal solvency crisis under the assumption
that it will be resolved with default to reduce the value of debt to a level consistent with
ﬁscal solvency. First, a crisis generally occurs when debt is below its upper bound. There
are two reasons for this. One is the upward sloping boundary locus in the approach to
maximum debt, which implies that the value of debt along the boundary locus is lower for
values of the surplus below the long-run equilibrium value. Second, a government might
21not be willing to let debt travel as high as its absolute maximum, eﬀectively lowering the
boundary locus and the value of debt which elicits a crisis.
Ac r i s i si sd e ﬁned by a sudden stop of capital ﬂows in which international creditors
refuse to lend to the government. A government cannot borrow again in the private
market until it has responded to the crisis in a way to entice creditors back into the
market. Therefore, the government cannot postpone its response and continue its current
ﬁscal policy when that policy requires either new debt or rolling over existing debt. This
implies that lending is not restored until after the crisis-resolving policy of default. In
particular, debt postponement or additional lending by an oﬃcial agency like the IMF or
the EU, without a reduction in the present value of repayments, cannot restore solvency
and the ability to borrow on the private market.
Crises are imperfectly predictable. Once a crisis becomes possible, the interest rate
rises, reﬂecting the expected capital loss on debt. The increase in the interest rate causes
debt to accumulate more quickly, increasing the probability of a crisis. The more rapid
growth in debt, due to the higher interest rate, implies that a crisis can occur even when
the economy receives a favorable shock. This is possible when the favorable shock is small
relative to the expected capital loss. However, if a country receives large enough favorable
shocks, then it can escape the crisis.
Crises develop suddenly. For a country whose debt is substantially below the boundary
locus, the probability of a crisis over a ﬁnite horizon is approximately zero. However,
once debt is close enough to the boundary locus to elicit expectations of one-period-ahead
capital loss, then rising interest rates increase the rate of growth of debt. This implies
that to avoid a crisis, the country must on average receive favorable ﬁscal shocks.
22Debt reduction, due to default, is never one hundred percent. The value for γt is
determined in equilibrium to assure that debt reaches the boundary locus leading to
a long-run equilibrium. Partial debt reduction in a crisis is consistent with empirical
evidence, but it contrasts with the traditional sovereign default model in which debt
reduction is always one hundred percent.
3.3 Other Possible Policy Responses
Reduction of the magnitude of debt through default is not the only possible policy response
to a ﬁscal solvency crisis. Other possible responses are brieﬂy considered here, but full
analysis of them is in other papers (Daniel 2010, Daniel and Shiamptanis 2010) or is left
to future research.
Once a crisis becomes anticipated with positive probability, the government could
implement ﬁscal reform, designed to raise the expected present value of future surpluses.
The reform could take the form of changes in the policy parameters of the surplus rule
(α,λ) or an increase in the surplus for a speciﬁc period of time, as with a positive mean
to the ﬁscal shock, νt. If this policy response raises the expected present value of future
surpluses enough to eliminate near-term risk, and agents know that ﬁscal reform will be
the policy response to a sudden stop in lending, then there should be no increase in a
country’s interest rate as it nears a crisis. However, given that the probability of a ﬁscal
solvency crisis becomes positive following negative ﬁscal shocks, most likely accompanied
by recession, the promise of larger near-term surpluses is unlikely to satisfy a cost-beneﬁt
analysis. The sovereign must weigh the costs and beneﬁts of ﬁscal austerity in recession,
when it had not chosen austerity in normal times. A decision not to undertake ﬁscal
23reform has features similar to the original sovereign default models. It is quite likely that
a sovereign, facing a ﬁscal solvency crisis and a recession, would decide against additional
austerity, and that is implicitly the assumption in our model with default as the policy
response to a crisis. Additionally, if the sovereign does choose ﬁscal reform, its eﬀectiveness
in keeping interest rates from rising in the run-up to the crisis and restoring lending after
the crisis, depends on its credibility. Austerity in bad times could face credibility issues,
although IMF or European Union oversight might enhance credibility. However, even
after ﬁscal reform, ﬁscal policy still has risk, and future shocks could once again raise the
probability of a crisis.
Another possible response would be the promise of ﬁscal transfers from member coun-
tries to the crisis country. Such a response was negotiated between Greece and the EMU
in April 2010 in the form of a loan with below-market interest rates. If the market knew
that the EMU would provide ﬁscal transfers suﬃcient to restore solvency without default,
then interest rates should not rise as debt nears the boundary locus. However, such trans-
fers explicitly violate the EMU agreement whereby countries are not liable for debts of
member countries. And accepting liability in the event of a crisis has an obvious moral
hazard problem. The fact that interest rates have risen inspite of the commitment for the
loan, implies that the subsidy is not large enough to move Greece far enough below the
boundary locus to eliminate expectations of default.
Alternatively, the union’s monetary authority could use monetary policy instruments
to restore ﬁscal solvency to the insolvent government. It could resort to an increase
in traditional seigniorage to provide additional revenue to the crisis country, eﬀectively
increasing feasible surpluses and the upper bound on debt. Or it could switch to a
24passive monetary policy, allowing the crisis country to switch to an active ﬁscal policy,
as in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, whereby stochastic and symmetric jumps in
prices maintain ﬁscal solvency. Such a policy switch is usually accompanied by a jump
in inﬂation on the crisis date, reducing the real value of debt through surprise inﬂation.
Daniel (2010), Daniel and Shiamptanis (2010) provide an analysis of this policy response.
An extreme response would be withdrawal by the crisis country from the monetary
union and re-issuance of its own currency, as suggested by Sims (1999), thereby restoring
its on monetary policy instruments to assure solvency. This policy must be accompanied
by either an increase in traditional seigniorage or by policy switching.
Finally, it is useful to consider how uncertainty about the nature of the policy response
would aﬀect crisis dynamics, which is determined largely by the interest response to the
expectations of a crisis. Consider the case of Greece and other highly indebted EMU
countries, and assume that the market places a positive probability on both default and on
ﬁscal transfers from the EMU. The positive probability on ﬁscal transfers should restrain
the rise in interest rates as debt approaches the boundary locus. Now, assume that the
EMU announces, counterfactually, that it will provide no ﬁscal transfers to Greece. Greek
interest rates would rise, to reﬂect the fact that all the probability mass has moved to
default. Additionally, interest rates in other highly-indebted EMU countries would rise
to reﬂect the same change in expectations, increasing the probability of additional crises.
Hence, the EMU justiﬁes the ﬁscal transfers to Greece is as a policy to prevent contagion
and additional crises.
254 Simulations of Crisis Risk
In this section, we use simulations to quantify the ﬁscal solvency risk faced by diﬀerent
countries in a monetary union when the crisis country responds with default. Given
parameter values for the N surplus rules, the distribution of νt, and the method of crisis
resolution, the system can be solved numerically and simulated to quantify the risk of
one country in the N-country monetary union encountering a crisis over a given period
of time.
For the simulations, we use estimates for the parameters of the surplus rule from
Daniel and Shiamptanis (2009). They provide group mean estimates of parameters for
the surplus rule in real terms using cointegration and error-correction models for a panel of
ten EMU countries with annual data over the 1970-2006 period. The baseline parameters
we use for the simulations are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
iαλg
parameters 0.0422 0.4987 1.3003 0.0262
standard errors 0.0061 0.0717 0.0901 0.0027
We adjust these estimates by the group mean panel estimate of the long-run value of
real output growth g to provide estimates for the parameters expressed as a fraction of
output.24 These parameters imply a growth-adjusted interest rate given by r =
i−g
1+g =
0.0156. For the target value of the long-run primary surplus, ϕ,w eu s et h ev a l u eo f
24The variables in the paper of Daniel and Shiamptanis (2009) are in real terms, whereas the variables in
this paper are expressed as percentages of output. This implies that the α in this paper is α = 0.5118
1+g =
0.4987.
260.93% of GDP which implies a target value for the long-run debt/GDP of 60%. Under
the assumption that ﬁscal shocks have a normal distribution with mean zero, the panel
estimate of their standard error is 1.42% of GDP. We let the upper bound on the ﬁscal
shocks, ¯ ν, be 4.26% of GDP, which corresponds to three standard deviations. We set the
desired maximum value of debt,
ˆ ϕ
r, which is the eﬀective upper bound, at 141%, larger
than any of these countries has experienced the last thirty-six years.
We use 1,000 replications of a ten-year simulation to estimate the probability of a ﬁscal
crisis. In each simulation, initial values of debt/GDP (bt−1) and the primary surplus/GDP
(st−1) are used to set the initial value for the distance, Ωt−1, and for the slope of the
boundary locus, βt−1 − 1.I f βt−1 > 0, then based on Ωt−1, the critical value for the
shock that would elicit default (ν∗
t) and the expectation for capital loss (Et−1γt) are
calculated. The dynamic system then receives a ﬁscal shock (νt) from the truncated
normal distribution and the value for capital loss (γt) is computed. If βt−1 > 0 and
γt =0 , or if βt−1 < 0, then next period’s surplus and debt are updated using equations
(7) and (8), which are then used to update Ωt and βt.25 The process is repeated for ten
years. If during the ten-year simulation we have a value of γt > 0, then there is a crisis and
the simulation ends. We repeat the ten-year simulation 1000 times. The probability of a
crisis over ten-years is the number of crises divided by 1000, the number of replications.
To determine the safety of a country which adheres to the Maastricht rules, we simu-
lated the model with values for initial debt and the primary surplus equal to the upper
bound of the Maastricht limits. We set debt at 60% of GDP and the primary surplus
at -2.06% which implies an actual surplus of -3% of GDP. Under the baseline parameter
25We also check that μt−1 > 0. In our simulations, we never obtain a negative value.
27values, ﬁscal policy is completely safe with no crises over ten years in the 1,000 replica-
tions. We considered several sensitivity analysis scenarios to raise the risk. These include
changing parameter values one at a time by one standard deviations in the risky direc-
tion.26 The probability of a ﬁscal crisis for a country at the Maastricht limits is zero under
all sensitivity analyses designed to increase risk. Therefore, these results suggests that
countries with debt and primary surplus at the Maastricht limits are perfectly safe over
the ten year horizon.
Next we consider whether countries like Belgium, France and Germany, with moderate
deviations from the Maastricht limits, are moving into a risky region. We repeated the
simulations for these countries, using their 2009 values of debt/GDP and primary sur-
plus/GDP.27 Under the baseline parameters Belgium, France and Germany are perfectly
safe over the ten-year horizon. Additionally, these countries are perfectly safe under all
one-standard-deviation parameter changes except for the changes which increase the real
interest rate (i) by 61 basis points or a reduce real output growth rate (g) by 27 basis
p o i n t s .T h ei n c r e a s ei ni raises the probability of a crisis for Belgium to 100%, for France
to 8.1%, and for Germany to 0.1%. A reduction in g raises the probability of a crisis only
for Belgium to 2.3%. Since the probability of a crisis rises so dramatically, especially for
Belgium, we calculated how large r would have to be for Belgium, France and Germany
to begin experiencing risk. In Figure 2, we show that Belgium experiences positive risk
with a 17 basis points increase in r. France and Germany require larger increases of 37
and 59 basis points, respectively. Therefore, deviations from the Maastricht limits could
26Experiments included raising i to 0.0483, reducing λ to 1.2102,r e d u c i n gα to 0.427, and reducing g to
0.0235
27The 2009 values for debt/GDP and primary surplus/GDP for Belgium were 101.18% and -2.09%, for
France were 84.53% and -5.28%, and for Germany were 77.36% and -0.94%. Source: OECD March 2010.
28imply risk for parameter values of variables, determining the real interest rate, within one
standard deviation of their estimated values.
Next we consider whether high-debt countries like Italy and Greece, which have vi-
olated the Maastricht rules, face risk over the next ten years. For Italy, the 2009 value
of debt/GDP was 123.57%, and the primary surplus/GDP was -0.60%. For Greece, the
2009 value of debt/GDP was 114.88% and the primary surplus/GDP was -8.17%.28 Under
the baseline parameter values, the probability of crisis for Italy is 2.3% and for Greece
is 1.4%. Of course, small changes in the parameters in the risky direction increase risk,
with the risk increasing at an increasing rate due to the eﬀect of expectations. How would
less risky values of parameters aﬀect risk? We can think of these changes as ﬁscal reform
which could be taken to reduce the probability of a crisis as it approaches.
To address this question, we consider how the crisis probability changes when the
policy parameters α and λ change by one standard deviations in the less-risky direction.
When λ increases to 1.3904, which implies that primary surplus responds more strongly
to debt, the probability of a ﬁscal crisis for Italy falls to 1.4% and for Greece falls to 0.9%.
When α increases to 0.5704, which implies less persistence in the primary surplus, the
probability of a ﬁscal crisis for Italy falls to 0.8% and for Greece falls to 0.1%. The results
in Figure 3 show that the probability of ﬁscal crisis is sensitive to changes in α and λ,b u t
even if countries choose less-risky policy parameters by a full standard deviation, they
cannot completely eliminate risk. The risk is due to the upper bound and the stochastic
shocks to the surplus.





28Source: OECD Economic Outlook March 2010.
29of GDP. Perhaps risk is lower because Greece and Italy would actually be willing and able





would have to be for Italy and Greece to be safe. Under baseline parameters,
Figure 4 shows that crisis probability becomes zero for both countries once
ˆ ϕ
r increases to
148%. Numerical computation shows that a ﬁscal policy with debt reaching 148% must
allow primary surpluses to reach values of 2.67%. In the last forty years, primary surplus
for Italy was higher than 2.67% 8 times, and for Greece was higher than 2.67% 5 times.29






OECD projects debt to rise in 2011 for many European countries. Therefore, we
considered how high debt would have to be for Belgium, France and Germany to begin
experiencing risk under baseline parameter values, and how crisis probability changes for
Italy and Greece as debt increases from its 2009 value. Using baseline parameter values
with the primary surplus at its 2009 value, Figure 5 shows that crisis probability becomes
positive for Belgium, France and Germany once debt exceeds 114%, 111% and 115% of
GDP, respectively. All of these exceed OECD forecasts for 201130, implying no risk of a
crisis at baseline parameter values. The OECD forecasts 2011 debt for Italy at 129.7%
and for Greece at 130.2%. If debt does reach these levels with surpluses at their 2009
values, then the ten-year risk of a ﬁscal crisis for Italy rises to 10.4% and for Greece to
69.1%. The large increase in the probabilities reﬂects the result that the probability of a
crisis is increasing in debt at an increasing rate.
29In the last forty years, the largest primary surplus for Italy is 6.09% (in 1997) and for Greece is 3.65%
(in 1999).
30OECD forecasts for debt for Belgium, France and Germany are 108.45%, 99.15% and 85.46% of GDP,
respectively. (OECD Economic Outlook March 2010)





the crisis probability becomes positive for Greece when debt exceeds 109% of GDP. This
shows that a ﬁscal solvency crisis can occur when debt is 32 percentage points below its
eﬀective upper bound. This is because of the upward sloping boundary locus towards the
maximum debt which implies that the upper bound is lower for small values of primary
surplus.
Crisis probability rises at an increasing rate, either as parameter values change in the
risky direction or as debt increases, because expectations of debt devaluation rise as the
economy approaches the boundary locus. Higher expected debt devaluation increases the
interest rate and increases the rate at which debt accumulates. As a country approaches
the boundary locus, a slight change in parameters or in debt can create a dramatic change
in crisis probability. This illustrates forcefully that a country receiving favorable shocks
can substantially reduce and/or eliminate the probability of crisis without ﬁscal reform.
It also illustrates the reverse. A country can substantially increase its crisis probability
with small changes in debt which push it critically toward the boundary locus.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
What does economic theory have to say about recent interest rate spikes in Greece, and
the Greek government and the EMU focus on ﬁscal measures to resolve the problem?
Existing sovereign default models, either those in which the sovereign weighs the costs
and beneﬁts of complete default or those in which default is the bad outcome in a model
with multiple equilibria, are not designed to address the ﬁscal solvency issues that appear
to be at the heart of this potential crisis.
31The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is the development of a new model of sovereign
default. Monetary union eliminates individual-country monetary policies, which could
be used to provide seigniorage and debt devaluation through inﬂation, leaving a country
more vulnerable to ﬁscal insolvency. We assume that institutions are strong enough that
a sovereign usually repays, but no sovereign can make an unconditional commitment to
repay. We model this by assuming that the ﬁscal authority commits to a surplus rule with
parameter values chosen to reﬂect the optimal choice of risk. The surplus rule is subject
to stochastic shocks, as with the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Together the stochastic shocks
and the upper bound on debt imply that the government could ﬁnd itself in a position for
which the expected present value of future surpluses is less than the value of debt necessary
to continue the ﬁscal policy rule. Agents refuse to lend into this position of insolvency,
and a sudden stop of capital ﬂows deﬁnes the ﬁscal solvency crisis. Once crisis probability
becomes positive, interest rates increase, reﬂecting expectations of capital loss on debt.
Rising interest rates accelerate the rate of increase of debt, increasing the probability of
a crisis at an increasing rate.
The second contribution of this paper is that we simulate the model to provide esti-
m a t e so ft h ep r o b a b i l i t yo faﬁscal solvency crisis for EMU countries, under the assumption
that a crisis will be resolved with default. We ﬁnd that for countries with debt and the
primary surplus bound by the Maastricht Treaty limits, there is no probability that sto-
chastic ﬁscal shocks could send debt onto a path along which it would be expected to
violate the upper bound. Therefore, countrie sa d h e r i n gt ot h eM a a s t r i c h tl i m i t sh a v en o
probability of ﬁscal solvency crisis over a ten year horizon. We also simulate the model
using 2009 values of debt and the primary surplus for several EMU countries. We ﬁnd
32that countries with moderate violations of the Maastricht rules are safe, while countries
with large violations, like Greece and Italy, are not.
We can use these results and the implications of the model to understand the early
2010 interest rate spikes in Greece as reﬂecting expectations of a ﬁscal solvency crisis.
The model implies that the high government debt and the low primary surplus, together
with the possibility that a ﬁscal solvency crisis could be resolved with default, were the
cause of the interest rate premium. News that the Greek government misrepresented the
value of its surpluses reduced the expected present value of future surpluses and increased
this interest rate premium. Non-concessionary loans from the EMU can reduce imminent
borrowing needs from the private sector, but since they do not either reduce the value
of debt or raise the expected present value of future surpluses, they have no impact on
the probability of a future solvency crisis. Concessionary loans or outright transfers from
the EU could reduce the probability of a ﬁscal solvency crisis. Greek promises in March
2010 to raise current and near-term primary surpluses were successful in bringing down
the interest premium and did allow the government to sell bonds on the private market.
H o w e v e r ,t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ep r e m i u mr e m a i n sp o s i t i v ea so ft h i sp a p e r ’ sw r i t i n g ,r e ﬂecting
a continued positive risk of a ﬁscal solvency crisis. The model implies that unless transfers
and/or present-value surplus adjustments are large enough to set the probability of crisis
in the near-term to zero, Greece must experience ﬁscal shocks more favorable than average
to avoid a ﬁscal solvency crisis.
336 Appendix: Default
6.1 Solutions
When ﬁscal policy is passive and monetary policy active, the time paths for each country’s
surplus and debt relative to output are
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2 [θ2νk +( θ2 − 1+α)(γk − Ek−1γk)]
)
(20)
where θ1 ≤ 1 and θ2 < 1 are the eigenvalues of the characteristic equation (9). When the
country is far from a crisis, γt = Et−1γt =0 . The values for γt and its expectations in the
neighborhood of a crisis are endogenized as part of the model’s full solution.
6.2 Proofs
6.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume a value for st−1 for which βt−1 > 0 and μt−1 > 0, and deﬁne f (νt) as a bounded,
symmetric, mean-zero distribution for νt, with bounds ± ¯ ν. Deﬁne ν∗
t as a critical value
34for νt such that
γt > 0 for νt <ν
∗
t,
γt =0 for νt ≥ ν
∗
t.
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Substituting into equation (17) yields an implicit expression for γt as
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t) has the interpretation as the probability of ﬁscal solvency crisis.
To determine the probability of ﬁscal solvency crisis, F (ν∗
t), and the expectations
of default, Et−1γt, we ﬁrst solve for ν∗
t. Deﬁne χt =
R ν∗
t




t exists iﬀ t h e r ee x i s t sav a l u ef o rν∗
t,s a t i s f y i n g−¯ ν ≤ ν∗
t ≤ ¯ ν, which sets
μt−1Ωt−1 +βt−1χ
t =0such that γt =0in equation (23).
Given that βt−1 > 0 and μt−1 > 0, the proof must show that χ
t ≤ 0 for all possible
values for ν∗
t. Let ν∗
t take on its smallest possible value of −¯ ν. Then χ
t = −¯ ν<0. The
derivative of χ
t with respect to ν∗
t is given by 1 − F (ν∗
t). For ν∗
t < ¯ ν, the derivative
is positive. Therefore, as ν∗
t rises, χ
t rises monotonically. Once ν∗
t takes on its largest
possible value, given by ¯ ν, 1 − F (¯ ν)=0 ,a n dχ
t takes on its maximum value of zero.
35Therefore, χ
t ≤ 0 for all feasible values of ν∗
t. Since χ
t ≤ 0, a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for μt−1Ωt−1 +βt−1χ
t =0is Ωt−1 ≥ 0.
When Ωt−1 ≥ 0,as o l u t i o nf o rν∗
t exists, and the expectations of default are given by
the solution of equation (22).
6.2.2 Proof of Corollary 1
When Ωt−1 > 0,χ
t < 0, requiring ν∗
t < ¯ ν. Therefore, the probability of a crisis, given
by F (ν∗
t), is less than one. When Ωt−1 =0 ,ν ∗
t must set χ
t =0 , implying that ν∗
t =¯ ν.
Therefore, the probability of a crisis, given by F (¯ ν), is one.
6.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Equilibrium in period t requires Ωt ≥ 0. This is because Proposition 1 shows that there
can be no rational expectations value for Etγt+1 when Ωt < 0 under the initial policy mix
without default. Therefore, if Ωt < 0, there is no equilibrium unless the country defaults.
Using equation (15) and (16), yields
Ωt = μt−1Ωt−1 + βt−1νt − Et−1γt + γt = γt − ˜ γt.
Therefore, when Ωt < 0, ˜ γt > 0. A positive shadow rate triggers default. Default, with
γt =˜ γt, sets Ωt =0 , restoring equilibrium by Proposition 1.
6.2.4 Proof of Corollary 2
The position of the boundary locus is increasing in ˆ ϕ.
6.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Ad e f a u l ti np e r i o dt, which brings the system to the boundary locus, implies that Ωt
=0 . When Ωt =0 , the probability of a crisis in period t +1is unity by Corollary 1,
36and Proposition 1 yields Etγt+1 ≥ βt¯ ν. Given a realization for νt+1, default occurs in
the magnitude to set Ωt+1 =0 . The pattern persists until the dynamics imply that debt
passes point X along the adjustment path BLP.
6.2.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The calculations in the proof of Proposition 1 can be used to demonstrate that the ex-
pected value of default is zero once βt−1 =0 , implying that the one-period-ahead proba-
bility of a crisis is zero. Once βt−1 < 0, equation (15) shows that negative shocks increase
the distance such that crises do not occur for negative shocks. Positive shocks reduce the
distance, but since they also reduce debt, they cannot send debt above
ˆ ϕ
r. Therefore, if the
system has not traveled above the boundary locus, as necessary in equilibrium, and has
reached a point such that βt−1 < 0, a shock cannot send debt above its desired maximum
level from this position. Crisis probability is zero.
37 
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Figure 1: Passive Fiscal Policy
Note: s∗ =
ˆ ϕ(1−αλ)−α(1−λ)ϕ
1−α is the value of s along the adjustment path BP at the point L








































































































































































































































































128 130 132 134 136 138 140 142 144 146 147 149
























128 130 132 134 136 138 140 142 144 146 147 149


































































































































































Figure 5: The probability of ﬁscal crisis as a function of debt/GDP
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